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Daniel D. Bradlow2
Abstract
More than 25 years ago the multilateral development banks (MDBs) began establishing
independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs), such as the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, to
address concerns about MDB accountability to those communities and groups who were
harmed by their decisions and actions. This essay argues that these mechanisms need updating.
In the interests of promoting new and creative thinking about these mechanisms, it makes an
ambitious two-part proposal designed to improve the efficacy of the IAMs, while also respecting
the sovereignty of their member states and protecting an appropriate level of immunity for the
MDBs. First, the MDBs should jointly create a super- IAM that can receive requests for
investigations from people who allege that they have been harmed by the failure of any MDB
to comply with its own policies and procedures. Second, the MDB stakeholders should create
an independent fund, financed by contributions from individuals, corporations, foundations,
states and international organizations, that can provide support to communities and individuals
who the super-IAM found were harmed by a non-compliant MDB-funded project.

One of the most significant developments in international affairs since the Second World War
has been the expanding role of international organizations. They were designed to act with
restraint, out of respect for the sovereignty of their member states, and in support of their
member state’s efforts to promote international peace and security, international economic
cooperation and promote human welfare.3 However, some of them are now actively engaged in
performing such functions in their member states as peacekeeping; managing refugee camps;
reviewing the performance of national financial sectors; financing and monitoring the
implementation of development projects and programmes; giving policy advice and providing
technical assistance.4 This means that these organizations are making decisions that are directly
affecting the lives of the citizens of their member states.
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This evolution in their operations has implications for the relationship between individual
international organizations and their member states and for their accountability to those who
are affected by their operations.

The multilateral development banks(MDBs) provide a good illustration of these changes in the
role of international organizations. They have evolved from institutions focused on merely
funding specific projects into entities involved in a range of development financing and
advisory activities in their member states. They have also become leaders in formulating,
interpreting and applying standards for dealing with the environmental and social impacts of
development projects. Consequently, their decisions are directly affecting the societies in which
the projects and programmes they fund are located. These developments have raised concerns
about how those communities or groups that are adversely affected by their operations can hold
the MDBs accountable for their decisions and their impacts.
This essay will discuss how the MDBs5 -- the World Bank Group, the African, Asian, and InterAmerican Development Banks and more recently the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank – are
dealing with the issue of accountability. It will argue that, although the MDBs have been leaders
in promoting international organizational accountability, their mechanisms of accountability
are not keeping up with the evolution in their operations. In the interests of promoting new and
creative thinking about these issues, it will also make an ambitious proposal for how the MDBs
jointly can more effectively meet the accountability challenge that they face while also
respecting the sovereignty of their member states and protecting an appropriate level of
immunity for the MDBs.
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The paper is divided into two parts. The first part will provide some background on the MDBs
and their current approach to accountability. The second part discusses the proposal for
improving MDB accountability.

Background on the MDBs

The oldest MDB, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or Bank),
was created at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 and opened for business in 1946.6 It has
been the model for all the MDBs created thereafter. Consequently, the points made below are
applicable to all the MDBs listed above, even though the discussion focuses on the IBRD, which
is the largest part of the World Bank Group.
When a state7 joins the IBRD it is authorized to buy a certain number of shares in the Bank.
The number of shares is determined by a formula that takes into account the size of the country’s
economy and its contribution to the global economy. The member state is only required to pay
a small portion of the price of each share and to commit to provide the rest of the price if called
upon to do so. Each member state’s vote depends on the number of shares that it owns. This
means that the Bank operates with a weighted voting system in which the member states do not
have equal votes.8

At the time of its creation, the IBRD was a bold innovation in global finance. There had never
been an institution like it. Consequently, there was considerable uncertainty about how
effectively it would function. The first source of uncertainty was that the member states were
sovereign states but they were joining an organization which would operate on the basis of
weighted voting and not on the principle of the sovereign equality of states. This suggested that
a state could find itself bound by a decision or action that it had specifically opposed.9

6
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The drafters of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement sought to assure member states that the Bank
would respect their sovereignty by stipulating that its staff would operate in a fair and objective
way. They were specifically prohibited from being influenced by the political character of the
member state and were instructed that their decision-making should only be based on economic
considerations, which should be evaluated impartially.10 The Articles also stipulate that the
IBRD staff owe their loyalty to the Bank and that they cannot show any favour to any individual
state.11These arrangements suggested that the Bank would focus their loan conditions on the
economic and financial aspects of the projects they were funding and would defer to the
borrower’s decisions, which many states saw as part of their sovereign prerogatives, regarding
the project’s social, political, cultural and environmental implications.

A second source of uncertainty related to the fact that the IBRD would be operating within the
territory of each of its member states. This created a risk that each member state could assert its
jurisdiction over the Bank and interfere with its operations.12 In other words, member states
could use their sovereignty to undermine the multinational character and mission of the Bank
and interfere with its ability to protect its rights as a creditor. In order to protect against this
risk, the Articles granted the IBRD full immunity from the jurisdiction of its member states
unless the Bank specifically waived its immunity.13

Over time, confidence in the IBRD and the other MDBs grew and these concerns were allayed.
Slowly their role began expanding beyond merely providing finance for infrastructure projects
in qualifying member states. They also began providing policy advice, technical assistance and
funding for a broad range of development activities. They also began playing a more active role
in the design and implementation of the projects and programmes that they financed. Their more
active role created the possibility that their decisions could directly impact, and therefore cause
harm to, the communities and social groups affected by their operations.14

These developments coincided with a growing general awareness of the need for project
sponsors to account for all the significant social and environmental impacts of their projects.15
10
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This means that they should assess these impacts in advance and should address them in their
project design, implementation and management plans. It also means that their funders should
make sure that the project sponsors have adequately assessed and addressed all these impacts
before they commit to funding the projects. This pushed the MDBs to assume an active role in
overseeing their borrowers’ assessments of the social and environmental impacts of the projects
that they funded. They also formulating more detailed operational policies and procedures
(OPPs) to help their borrowers and staff understand each particular MDB’s approach to these
issues.16

The MDBs faced a challenge when they took on this new role. There were only a few
universally accepted principles that were applicable to these environmental and social issues.
The most accepted requirement was that each project sponsor must conduct an environmental
and social impact assessment (ESIA) before deciding to undertake the project.17However, there
were not internationally agreed and universally accepted standards on how to allocate the costs
and benefits associated with the identified impacts. Historically, this decision was viewed as a
sovereign prerogative.

It is important to note that there are international legal standards that are widely accepted and
are applicable to the management of some of these issues. For example, almost all the MDB
member states have signed and ratified international human rights conventions.18These
conventions stipulate what rights individuals have. They also make clear that the ultimate
obligation to respect, protect and promote human rights rests with the state. However, they are
stated in general terms and they do not clarify how the responsibilities to deal with human rights
in a particular project or transaction should be managed. They also do not address, with any
specificity, how these responsibilities should be shared between the state, the borrower, the
16
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project sponsor, and the funder in a particular project or transaction. This means, in effect, that
each state, each borrower, each project sponsor and each funder must exercise its own discretion
in determining whether to support a particular project, based on their assessment of the social
and environmental impacts and how they will be managed. It also means that there is a high
risk in complex projects with substantial social and environmental impacts that key project
decision makers will be accused of making decisions that are not compliant with the applicable
international standards. This is because the decisions are unavoidably being made in conditions
of imperfect knowledge and they are inherently controversial.

It is therefore not surprising that the MDBs’ engagement with these environmental and social
issues generated tension between their rich member states and borrower member states.19 The
former group were strong advocates for implementing high environmental and social standards
in MDB-funded projects. It should be noted that it was easy for these states to take this position
because they do not borrow from the MDBs and so the MDBs would not be applying these
standards to their projects.

The borrower member states who would have to assume the burden of complying with whatever
standards the MDBs adopted were more cautious. They argued that it was their sovereign
prerogative to decide how much environmental and social risk they would assume in their
development projects and how they would allocate and manage these risks. They also contended
that, pursuant to their Articles, the MDBs were required to only consider economic factors in
their decision-making. They maintained that managing environmental and social issues requires
making political judgements and so should be treated by the MDBs as political concerns. This
meant that, from their perspective, the MDBs were exceeding their mandates by commenting
on these issues.

This tension was exacerbated by the advocacy of both local and international civil society
groups who opposed certain projects on environmental and social grounds. Since there was no
obvious forum in which these groups could take their concerns and have them addressed on
19

Most of the MDBs divide their member states into categories indicating which states are eligible to borrow
from the MDB and which are not. For example, the World Bank Group divides member states into different
groups for purposes of determining eligibility to borrow based on GNI per capita: in general, member states with
an annual GNI per capita below US$12055 ( 2017 dollars) are eligible to borrow from the World Bank Group and
those with an annual GNI per capita above US$12056 (2017 dollars) are not eligible to borrow. See, World Bank
Country and Lending Groups , https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bankcountry-and-lending-groups(last visited on May 13, 2019).

6

their merits, they tended to take their campaigns to the media and to lobby their own countries’
governments, politicians and World Bank Executive Directors. As a result, these campaigns
became politicized and the source of serious reputational risk for the World Bank. This was
demonstrated in the 1980s by the handling of such controversial World Bank projects as the
Narmada Dam in India and road projects in the Amazon area of Brazil.20

To its credit, the World Bank responded creatively to this challenge by establishing the
Inspection Panel.21 This was the first mechanism in an international organization which nonstate actors can utilize to hold the organization directly accountable for the consequences of its
conduct.

The Inspection Panel is an independent three-member panel that is authorized to investigate
complaints from any two or more people who claim they have been harmed or threatened with
harm by the failure of the World Bank to comply with its OPPs. They are independent of the
management of the Bank. Panel members are appointed for one non-renewable five-year term
by the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors (the Board) and they report directly to the Board.
In addition, they can only be fired for cause by the Board.

The Panel is authorized to receive any request for an investigation from any two or more persons
who allege that they have been harmed or threatened with harm by the Bank’s failure to comply
with its own OPPs. The Board decides whether to approve the request and authorize the Panel
to investigate, based on a recommendation from the Panel. If the investigation is improved, the
Panel, after conducting an independent investigation, submits its findings to the Board, which
can accept or reject these findings. The Board will publicly release the Panel report and the
management’s response to the report after its deliberations on the report. The management is
expected to develop an action plan for addressing any issues of non-compliance identified by
the Panel.

20

Bradford Morse & Thomas R. Berger, Sardar Sarovar- Report of the Independent Review, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW RESEARCH CENTRE, http://ielrc.org/Content/c9202.pdf (last visited on May 12, 2019);
BRUCE REICH, THE WORLD BANK AND THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION (2013)
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The World Bank Inspection Panel was established on Sept. 22, 1993, by IBRD Res. No. 93-10 and IDA No.
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"Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel – 1996Clarification of Certain Aspects of the
Resolution", and April 20, 1999 in the"1999 Clarification of the Board's Second Review of the Inspection Panel";
IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE (2nd ed., 2000); Daniel Bradlow,
International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34(3)
VIRGINIA J. INT’L LAW (1994).
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It is important to note that the Panel only investigates the compliance of the Bank staff with the
OPPs and does not look into the conduct of the borrower or of any other actor in the project.
Since the Panel does not investigate its member states, it does not implicate their sovereignty.

After the World Bank established the Inspection Panel, the other MDBs created their own
independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs)22. They all have the same basic approach to
independence and to investigating non-compliance by their staff with the applicable
OPPs.23Over time, cooperation between the IAMs has grown. They have now formed a network
that meets once a year to share information and experiences.24 As part of this meeting, they also
meet with a counterpart network that consists of civil society groups that have an interest in
these mechanisms.

More than 25 years have passed since the first IAM was established. Consequently, there has
been sufficient time to assess the IAMs’ strengths and weaknesses.25

The most obvious contribution of the IAMs is that they provide a means for holding those with
authority accountable for the way in which they exercise their authority. 26 Thus, they have

22

See, for example, THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK- INDEPENDENT REVIEW MECHANISM (IAM),
https://www.afdb.org/en/independent-review-mechanism/(last visited on May 12, 2019); THE ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT
BANKACCOUNTABILITY
MECHANISM,
https://www.adb.org/site/accountabilitymechanism/main(last visited on May 12, 2019); THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK- INDEPENDENT
CONSULTATION AND INVESTIGATION MECHANISM, https://www.iadb.org/en/mici/independent-consultation-andinvestigation-mechanism (last visited on May 12, 2019); THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANKPROJECT-AFFECTED
PEOPLE’S
MECHANISM,
https://www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/operationalpolicies/policy-on-the-project-affected-mechanism.html(last visited on May 12, 2019); THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT- PROJECT COMPLAINT MECHANISM, https://www.ebrd.com/work-withus/project-finance/project-complaint-mechanism.html(last visited on May 12, 2019).
23
However, in addition to investigating compliance with the applicable OPPs, the IAMs at the other MDBs – but
not the Inspection Panel – also undertake dispute resolution. This means that they use their good offices to deal
with disputes between affected communities and the MDB’s borrower. These dispute resolution procedures are
entirely voluntary.
24
INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS NETWORK, http://independentaccountabilitymechanism.net/
(last visited on May 12, 2019).
25
This paper will not focus on their substantive work which would require an analysis of their cases, which is
beyond the scope of this paper. For examples of cases in which Inspection Panel has produced benefits for
requesters see, Chapter 3 and 4 relating to the Jamuna Bridge project and the Uganda Hydropower project in THE
WORLD BANK, ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK: THE INSPECTION PANEL (2003). But cases before the
Inspection Panel do not always bring satisfactory results for requesters- see DANA CLARK, JONATHAN A. FOX AND
KAY TREAKLE, DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION
PANEL (2003)..
26
D. Bradlow and A. Naude Fourie, The Operational Policies and Procedures of the World Bank and the
International Finance Corporation: Creating Law-Making and Law Governed Institutions, 10 International
Organizations Law Review 3 (2013)
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encouraged the management and staff of the MDBs to place greater emphasis on complying
with their institution’s OPPs as a way of demonstrating that they are exercising their decisionmaking authority responsibly. This is sometimes expressed in the World Bank as “Panelproofing” a project.27 This increased focus on OPP-compliance should help ensure that the
MDBs are performing their mandates as effectively as possible.
The IAM’s also contribute to the MDBs learning all the lessons that they can from their
operations. In this regard, the IAMs offer the MDBs a unique opportunity. They are the only
entity within the MDBs whose work is initiated by groups or communities that have been
adversely affected by the projects that the MDBs fund. Consequently, they are able to offer the
MDBs unique insights into their operations and the impact they have at a community level. It
is important to recognize in this regard, that in many cases, the cause of the MDB staff’s failure
to comply with the OPPs is that they are operating in complex environments with imperfect
knowledge. As a result, the risk that, despite acting with great professional responsibility and
judgement, they will make decisions that turn out to be sub-optimal, is not insignificant. The
lessons learned function of the IAMs helps reduce this risk. It also helps the Bank staff and
management learn how well their OPPs are functioning and to identify any weaknesses in the
OPPs. The IAMs therefore should help the MDBs ensure that their OPPs are fit for purpose.

Third, the IAMs contribute to making the MDBs more transparent. In order for the IAMs to
function effectively, it is necessary that the banks make their OPPs publicly available. As a
result, it is easier for outside stakeholders to learn more about the way in which the MDBs
operate. In fact, in recent years, some MDBs have engaged in extensive public consultations
about their OPPs.28

The IAMs are also facing some challenges. The first is that the tension that the IAMs created
between borrower and creditor member states has persisted.29 This is due in part to borrower

27

Jonathan A. Fox, The World Bank Inspection Panel: Lessons from the First Five Years, 6(2) GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE279, 310 (2000).
28
The
World
Bank,
Environmental
and
Social
Framework,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/383011492423734099/pdf/114278-WP-REVISED-PUBLICEnvironmental-and-Social-Framework.pdf (2017); THE WORLD BANK- PROJECTS AND OPERATIONS:
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmentaland-social-framework (last visited on May 12, 2019).
29
See, for example, A. Ebrahim and S. Herz, Accountability in Complex Organizations: World Bank Responses to
Civil Society Working Paper 08-027, Harvard Business School, (2007) available at:
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/08-027_18c99232-358f-456e-b619-3056cb59e915.pdf
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states’ ongoing concerns that the IAMs are unwittingly contributing to undermining their
sovereignty and that they are causing problems for their governments. One reason is that
complaints to the IAMs can lead to the requesters getting additional project benefits that are not
available to communities and groups that have been adversely affected by non-MDB funded
projects. Another is a concern that the government’s political opponents may use the IAMs to
embarrass the government. This issue is important for the efficacy of the IAMs because one of
their key contributions should be that they help to depoliticize disputes arising from MDB
funded projects.

There are two reasons to think that these tensions may now be more amenable to resolution.
The first is that in a recent US Supreme Court case, Jam v IFC,30the Court ruled that, at least in
US courts, international organizations have the same restricted immunity as states. The decision
leaves many unanswered questions about the scope of MDB immunity and so increases the risk
of litigation against MDBs with a presence in the US or in states that may choose to adopt a
similar approach. This means that borrower countries now face the real possibility that their
MDB-funded projects could end up in foreign courts, with unpredictable and potentially
embarrassing outcomes. Based on the limited available jurisprudence31 and international human
rights standards, the best way for them to avoid this unfortunate possibility is for the MDBs to
provide those adversely affected by their operations with a meaningful remedy that courts could
view as equivalent to a judicial remedy.

The second, is that because of climate change, there is a growing appreciation around the world
of the importance of accounting for the environmental and social impacts of projects.32
Consequently, there should be increased willingness from all states to have the MDBs, which
are generally seen to have state of the art OPPs, comply with these standards.
Another important and complex challenge pertains to the situation in which the IAM’s
investigation confirms that the relevant MDB has failed to comply with the applicable OPPs
and that this has caused harm. In this case, the MDB management develops an action plan that

30

Jam v. International Finance Corp,586 U. S. __ (2019).
See for instance, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
32
See for instance, Network for Greening the Financial System, First Comprehensive Report: A Call for ActionClimate
change
as
a
Source
of
Financial
Risk,
https://www.banquefrance.fr/sites/default/files/media/2019/04/17/ngfs_first_comprehensive_report_-_17042019_0.pdf (last visited
on May 12, 2019).
31
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is intended to correct or mitigate the harm caused by the MDB.33 However, the cost of
implementing this plan in effect is either paid by the borrower or the other borrowing member
states even though the problem was caused by the MDB. The reason is that, unless the borrower
pays for the implementation itself, the MDB’s action plan will be financed either by increasing
the size of the borrower’s loan or, by the MDB itself paying the costs. In either case these
resources will be drawn from the MDB’s existing pool of available funds thereby diminishing
the amount available to other borrowing member states. Unfortunately, under existing
arrangements it is hard to avoid this situation because there is no other readily available pot of
money that can assist the adversely affected community.

A fourth challenge for the IAMs is that in recent years the MDBs have increased the scale of
their collaborations with each other.34 As a result, there are now more projects that are being
jointly funded by two or more MDBs. In many cases, these projects are governed by the OPPs
of the project’s lead MDB. This create sa risk that more than one IAM could receive a request
for investigation from an affected community. In principle, each IAM will only investigate
compliance with its own MDB’s operational policies. The different IAMs might, therefore,
either base their investigations and findings on different OPPs or on their own views of the lead
MDB’s OPPs. Either approach will increase the risk of inconsistent findings being made by the
different IAMs in jointly funded projects.

The IAMs, the MDBs and their member states need to address these challenges without unduly
restricting the MDBs ability to implement their mandates or undermining either the member
states’ sovereignty or the accountability of the MDBs. The next section discusses a proposal
that achieves these objectives.

33

See THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, https://www.inspectionpanel.org/ (last visited on May 12, 2019);
ANDRIA NAUDE FOURIE, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL CASEBOOK (2014).
34
See African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Inter-American Development Bank Group, International Fund for Agricultural Development,
Islamic Development Bank Group and the World Bank Group, Multilateral Development Banks: Working
together for more Effective Development Cooperation, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/mdb-brochure.pdf
(last visited on May 12, 2019); Development Banks Working Together to Optimize Balance Sheets, THE WORLD
BANK (Dec. 22, 2015) http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/22/development-banksoptimize-balance-sheets; Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) Announced a Joint Framework for Aligning
their Activities with the Goals of the Paris Agreement, THE WORLD BANK (Dec. 3, 2018)
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/12/03/multilateral-development-banks-mdbs-announceda-joint-framework-for-aligning-their-activities-with-the-goals-of-the-parisagreement?CID=CCG_TT_climatechange_EN_EXT.
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A Proposal for Improving MDB Accountability

In brief, the first part of this two-part proposal is for all the MDBs to create one combined IAM
that has the authority to receive requests for investigations from people who allege that they
have been harmed by the failure of any MDB to comply with its own policies and procedures.
The second part is to create an assistance fund that can provide support to help communities
and individuals who are found by the IAM to have been harmed by a non-compliant MDBfunded project. Each aspect of this proposal is discussed in more detail below.

One IAM for all MDBs
The proposal is that there should be one “super-IAM” (S-IAM) that can serve all the MDBs.35
This S-IAM, which would be created by agreement between all participating MDBs, would be
free-standing which means that it would be independent of all the MDBs. Since it would provide
an accountability service to all the MDBs, each of them would contribute to its budget on a prorata basis according to the number of cases arising from each participating MDB. The MDB
boards of directors would all vote to approve the members of the S-IAM. Each MDB would
agree to second staff to it for a stipulated period, for example-three years.

This S-IAM would operate according to similar compliance review procedures as all the
currently functioning IAMs. This means that it would be authorized to accept requests for
investigation from any two or more persons who allege that they have been harmed or
threatened with harm because of the failure of the MDB or MDBs funding a particular project
to comply with the applicable OPPs. The S-IAM would determine for itself the eligibility of the
request and, if found eligible, would investigate the issues raised in the request based on the
applicable OPPs. The reports of the investigation would be submitted to the Board of Executive
Director of the relevant MDB. The board would be required to either accept the findings of the
S-IAM and ensure that the management develops an action plan that is designed to resolve the

35

All the existing IAMs except the World Bank Inspection Panel offer requesters the possibility of engaging in a
voluntary dispute resolution process or a compliance review. This proposal only deals with compliance review.
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cases of non-compliance identified in the report or to issue a public explanation of their reasons
for rejecting the findings. As is the practice in almost all the current IAMs, the report would
also be made available to the requesters at the same time as it is provided to the relevant board.
The S-IAM would also monitor the implementation of the action plan in order to ensure that it
in fact resolves the problems that it identified in its investigation report.

It is not unprecedented for one review mechanism to have the authority to deal with cases
applying the rules of different international organizations. The ILO Administrative Tribunal is
authorized to decide cases based on the human resource policies of each of the organizations
that have accepted its authority to hear employment disputes. Currently, 57 organizations have
agreed to use the ILO Administrative Tribunal for this purpose.36

This S-IAM offers a number of advantages. First, it clearly demonstrates that the MDBs are
offering those who have been harmed by non-compliant projects a meaningful alternative to a
judicial remedy. This should help reduce the risk of litigation created by the Jam v IFC case
and thereby also help preserve the appropriate level of immunity for the MDBs. Second,
because the S-IAM is gathering information from investigations at all the MDBs, it will develop
a rich database of information on the implementation of the OPPs of the MDBs. This will
contribute to the lessons learned function of the IAMs. The additional knowledge about how to
assess and manage the social and environmental impacts should lead to improvements in the
design and implementation of MDB funded projects and the formulation and interpretation of
their OPPs. Third, it would mitigate the risk of inconsistent decisions in cases of jointly funded
projects.

The S-IAM will have some costs. Most significantly, there is a cost associated with the fact that
the IAM will not be located in any MDB. This means that it will lose the familiarity with the
MDB that the current IAMs can gain from interacting with the MDB staff and management on
a regular basis. There are two factors that suggest that this cost may not be significant. The first
is that the staff of the S-IAM will be officials seconded from the various MDBs. Consequently,
they will understand their own MDB well and so can help educate and inform the members of
the S-IAM about the culture and operating practices of the MDB. In addition, many of the
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For information on the ILO Administrative Tribunal, see: THE ILO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL,
https://www.ilo.org/tribunal/lang--en/index.htm (last visited on May 12, 2019).
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members of the current IAMs do not serve on a full-time basis and so do not interact on a regular
basis with the staff and management. In addition, since they only serve for a fixed term and
only after not being employed in any capacity by the MDB for a set period before appointment,
they are unlikely to have great familiarity with the MDBs staff and management when they join
the IAM. They are also unlikely to develop it during their tenure.

A second potential cost is that the S-IAM will have a large number of cases and will therefore
need a large budget and staff. There is no doubt that the S-IAM will need a larger staff and more
resources than any one of the currently existing IAMs. However, it is reasonable to expect that
the S-IAM will need a smaller staff than the sum of the total staff at the existing IAMs. The
reason is that the S-IAM will have a full-time panel. The current arrangements at the IAMs
involve part-time panel members. Thus, a smaller number of S-IAM panel members than the
sum of the current total of IAM members should be possible. It is also possible that the more
effective learning process that the S-IAM offers all the MDBs could result in less cases of noncompliant projects brought to the S-IAM than the total being brought to the current IAMs.

While the S-IAM will be larger than that at any of the existing IAMs, it will not result in a large
permanent bureaucracy. The S-IAM staff will consist of panellists who have been appointed
for fixed non-renewable terms and experts who are seconded for fixed periods of time from the
various MDBs. Thus, the staff will all be temporary and will work with the expectation that
they will be returning to their home MDB. It is important to note that the creation of the S-IAM
need not lead to additional financial costs for each MDB. The reason is that the creation of the
S-IAM, will allow each MDB to shut down its own IAM and use the funds for the S-IAM.

An Assistance Fund

The second part of this proposal is that that all the stakeholders in the MDBs should create an
independent Assistance Fund (the Fund) that can accept contributions from individuals,
corporations, foundations, states and international organizations. This Fund will provide
assistance to communities that the S-IAM finds have been harmed by an MDB’s failure to
comply with the applicable OPPs. All the categories of potential contributors have expressed
an interest in promoting both accountability at the MDBs and concern for the groups that have
been harmed by the MDBs’ failure to comply with their OPPs. Consequently, they should be
willing to contribute to a Fund that is independent of the MDBs, and that can assist individuals
14

and communities who the S-IAM has found were harmed by the relevant MDB’s failure to
comply with its own OPPs. Any award made by this Fund will not require a finding that any
particular party is to blame for the harm that they have suffered. Instead, it will be premised
merely on the finding that they have suffered harm and need assistance.

It is important to note that independent international funds that can raise funds from both state
and non-state actors to support specific purposes are not unprecedented. The following
international funds allow for contributions by non-state actors: The Trust Fund for Victims at
the International Criminal Court allows for individuals to contribute to the Trust Fund;37 The
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Inoculations (GAVI) accepts contributions from states,
foundations, civil society organizations(CSOs), corporations, and individuals38; the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria allows states, corps, foundations, and CSOs to
contribute;39 and the Global Partnership for Education accepts contributions from governments,
international organizations, foundations and the private sector.40

The Fund, will be overseen by a Board of Directors. The board members will participate in
their individual capacity and will be elected by all contributors to the Fund. The Board will
outsource the investing of the corpus of the Fund and the management of its financial
transactions to a fund manager.

The Board will also receive all requests for assistance. Any requester who submitted a request
for investigation to the S-IAM and was found to have been harmed by the non-compliance of
the relevant MDB will be eligible to file a request with the Fund. The request for assistance
would include a copy of the report of the S-IAM finding that the requester has suffered harm
because of the failure of the MDB to comply with its own OPPs and a motivation for the
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amount of assistance being requested. In no case, can the request exceed the amount that the
requesters would have received under the relevant MDB’s OPPs. The decision to provide
assistance will be made by the Fund’s Board. In determining the amount of assistance, the
Board will consider the severity of the harm suffered, and the amount of funds available that
year for assisting requesters.

The rationale for the Fund is that it is not inherently unreasonable for a society to decide that
since a particular project will produce benefits for the whole society over time, the social,
environmental, economic, and financial costs of the project should be shared by the whole
society. However, a problem arises when there has been a finding that a non-compliant MDB
has contributed to the costs falling disproportionately on a particular group or community in
the society. In this case, there is a basis for the international community providing the group or
community with special assistance to deal with its “disproportionate” share of the costs.

The Fund enables the requesters to receive this assistance while avoiding the problems that
would arise if the funds used to assist the affected group were contributed only by the relevant
MDB. As indicated above, this could mean that the funds are ultimately paid by the borrower
through an increase in the size of its loan or by the other borrower member states through
reduced availability of financing. After all, this would be another way of imposing a
disproportionate cost on one group of stakeholders in the MDBs.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the world in which the MDBs must operate has changed dramatically
since the first MDBs were created. They now have detailed OPPs to deal with the social and
environmental impacts of their operations that inform interested stakeholders about how they
can expect the MDBs to deal with these impacts. In addition, based on international law and
the evolving case law, the MDBs need to provide those who claim they have been harmed by
the failure of the MDBs to act in compliance with these OPPs with a meaningful means of
holding these MDBs accountable for their own failings. It therefore proposes that the MDBs
create a super-IAM to replace their individual IAMs. This S-IAM would be authorized to
receive and investigate claims from any of the MDBs. Its findings would be binding on the
relevant MDB unless the board of that MDB provides a specific public explanation for their
rejection of the findings.
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In addition, in order to ensure that any community or group who has been harmed by the noncompliant acts of the relevant MDB is assisted to address its harm and that the assistance does
not come at the expense of the relevant MDB’s member states, the MDBs should create an
independent Assistance Fund. The Fund should be authorized to receive contributions from
any state or non-state actor. It should only be able to provide assistance in cases where there
has been a finding of MDB non-compliance.

If the MDBs implement these two proposals, they will have created a structure that respects
the sovereignty of their member states and the rights of all project affected groups and
communities. It will also provide the basis for courts and member states governments to
provide MDBs with an appropriate level of immunity.
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